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We present new estimates of the long-run earnings consequences of job separations that 
occurred during the 1982 recession based on a representative sample of workers drawn from 
Social Security administrative earnings data ranging from 1974 to 2005. Workers 
permanently leaving their long-term employer in the period from 1980 to 1985 experienced 
large and persistent earnings reductions lasting 15 to 20 years compared to workers of 
similar age and earnings potential who did not leave their employer. Earnings losses last up 
to 15 years even for workers displaced in better economic times or after shorter job tenure. 
These losses arise both due to reductions in employment as well as to reductions in annual 
earnings for those working. These preliminary estimates appear to confirm results from 




1.  Introduction 
Job displacements through layoffs or plant closures are a common feature of the 
U.S. labor market. Conservative estimates suggest each year about 10% of workers leave 
their job involuntarily (e.g., Farber 2003), although the actual fraction may be much higher 
(e.g., Hildreth, von Wachter and Weber 2005, Farber 2007). Although job separations are so 
common, existing studies give conflicting estimates of the costs of job loss. While work 
based on the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) suggests the cost of job loss in terms of 
reduced earnings are small, increasing evidence from other data sources suggests that at least 
some groups of the labor force bear long-lasting consequences from job loss. In particular, 
studies based on large administrative earnings data sets from several U.S. states suggest 
earnings losses after job displacements may be large and long lasting (e.g., Ruhm 1991, 
Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993, Schoeni and Dardia 2002, Couch 2006). In addition, it 
has been shown that job losses reduce job stability, consumption and access to health 
insurance.1 
 An added difficulty with the existing estimates of the cost of job loss is that they are 
either based on short and small survey data sets or from administrative data covering only 
certain time periods and regions. Moreover, both data sources are typically too short to allow 
an evaluation of the long-term consequences of job loss. At present, there are no 
representative estimates of the long-term effects of job loss on earnings for the United 
States. We exploit access to a new data source that contains longitudinal information on 
earnings and employment histories for a large random sample of the U.S. population 
spanning over thirty years. Using this data, we evaluate the long-term effect of a job 
separation on the development of earnings and employment. Our data set is ideal for this 
purpose, since it contains information on workers’ employers, allowing us to date 
separations. Moreover, it allows us to focus on workers separating from stable jobs and 
follow their career developments for over twenty years. 
 As in existing data sources, it is difficult to clearly establish the cause of job 
separations with the information in our data. Here, we focus on job separations of mature 
workers in stable jobs occurring during the 1982 recession, the largest recession since the 
Great Depression. Given the steep rise in unemployment and the drop in economic activity, 
                                                 
1 Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001), Olson (1992). 
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it is unlikely that many workers moved voluntarily during this period. Moreover, most 
voluntary job mobility occurs within a few years of the start of a job, i.e., mobility drops 
sharply with job tenure. By focusing on separations from stable jobs, we are likely to exclude 
many voluntary moves. However, there is likely to be at least some voluntary job mobility. In 
so far as voluntary job movers are likely to experience wage gains, our estimates may 
understate the true costs of involuntary job separation.  
Any empirical analysis of the effect of involuntary job separations has to address two 
additional concerns. First, to assess the cost of job loss, we have to establish a counterfactual 
indicating how earnings would have developed in the absence of a separation. To do so, we 
compare the earnings development before and after job separation to the earnings of various 
groups of workers remaining in stable employment. Thus, we define stable workers as 
persons who are employed by the same employer for 3 or 6 years. Second, if firms selectively 
fire their least able workers, the pool of job separators is a non-random draw of the 
population and may differ systematically from the control group of stable workers. Our rich 
data set that extends over three decades allows us to approach this problem by including 
worker fixed effects, an approach that has become standard in the literature (e.g., Ruhm 
1990, Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993). Thereby, we control for the potential of 
selection by essentially matching job separators with workers not losing their jobs who have 
similar long-run earnings potential. 
We obtain three preliminary results. First, we find job separations during the early 
1980s led to large and persistent earnings losses that last over twenty years. Those workers in 
stable employment from 1974 to 1979 who left their jobs during 1980 to 1985 had – 
compared to workers with no permanent job separation during that period – initial earnings 
losses of 30%. These losses decline to 20% after ten years and drop below 10% only after 15 
years; they have not completely faded 20 years after a job loss. Second, for workers with 
lower pre-separation tenure or workers separating from their employers in better economic 
times, losses are still substantial and last up to 15 years. Third, our results indicate that the 
decomposition of job separators changes as we consider different time periods and tenure 
durations. This confirms the need for a strategy to control for selective job separations. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
summarizes our core descriptive results. The section begins with an examination of trends in 
the rate of job separation, goes on to assess the baseline characteristics of job separators, and 
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then presents our main results on the long-term earnings trends of job separators. Section 3 
then summarizes the statistical analysis of earnings losses at job separation; there we 
compare the earnings trends of job separators and stable workers while controlling for 
permanent heterogeneity in earnings potential using worker fixed effects. Section 4 presents 
some essential sensitivity analysis. The last section indicates directions of future research on 
this project. 
2.  Data and Sample 
 The sample of workers used for our analysis of the long-term consequences of job 
separations is based on three data sets. The three sources are the 2004 Continuous Work 
History Sample (CWHS) active file, a 1% extract from the Master Earnings File (MEF), and 
a 1% extract from the Longitudinal Employee-Employer Data (LEED). The 2004 CWHS 
gives us the baseline sample universe and basic demographic information for 1% of 
individuals covered by Social Security from 1957 to 2004. In a first step, we merge this 
baseline sample with information on workers’ total uncapped annual earnings for each job 
held in a given year beginning in 1978 through 2004 obtained from the MEF. Besides annual 
earnings and an identification number for each employer (EIN), the MEF also contains 
information on industry for each job. In a second step, we complement this data on 
uncapped earnings with information on annual earnings for each job from 1974 to 1977 
from the LEED. See the Data Appendix for more detailed information. 
Our sample was explicitly chosen to be comparable to the seminal work of Jacobson, 
Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) (henceforth JLS), who studied the effect of job loss of workers 
in stable employment from 1974 to 1979 during the early 1980s in Pennsylvania. JLS have 
become the benchmark in the literature on the effect of job loss, and we will compare our 
estimates explicitly to theirs below. To be comparable to JLS, however, we have to ensure 
that information from the LEED is comparable to that of the MEF. This is achieved in two 
steps. First, earnings in the LEED are capped at the Social Security taxable maximum. We 
follow a simple imputation procedure described in Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) to make 
the earnings levels from the LEED comparable to those in the MEF.  
Second, coverage of Social Security was extended in the late 1970s and early 1980s to 
encompass public administration and other sectors. To maintain consistency of our sample 
over time, we thereby exclude job separations from public administration and several social 
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services (such as health and legal services) from our sample. Following Kopczuk, Saez, and 
Song (2007) we also exclude job separations from agriculture. To avoid censoring of our 
earnings observations, these sectors remain as sources of post-separation employment. 
Excluding those sectors also helps to avoid changes in employer identification numbers 
(EIN) occurring due to administrative reasons. The exclusions also help to smooth the 
incidence of job separation considerably in the period from 1980 to 1987, when public 
administration was gradually added to the sample, and in 1978, the year we change data 
sources for uncapped earnings.  
From this sample, we extract two groups of male workers with high attachment to 
their employer. First, our main sample contains workers in stable employment from 1974 to 
1979. Second, we also keep a sample of workers in stable employment from 1978 to 1980. 
The latter sample has the advantage that it only includes data from the MEF, and is thus 
entirely based on an internally consistent data source. Moreover, the comparison of the 
effect of job separation for workers with high job tenure (six years) with workers with 
shorter job tenure (three years) is of intrinsic interest. In our sensitivity analysis, we will also 
consider alternative cohorts of workers with high job attachment throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. 
In our final restriction we follow JLS and impose that workers are born in or after 
1930. This implies that the average age at the time of job separation is roughly 40 years, and 
that the majority of the sample is in their prime working years during the follow-up period. 
Thereby, we avoid having to explicitly model retirement for our immediate follow-up. 
Clearly, our data series is so long that we cannot avoid the phenomenon that an increasing 
fraction of workers drops out of the labor force. This will be apparent in some of the results 
we discuss below. In the future, we will be able to directly examine the phenomenon of the 
receipt of public pension and disability insurance using administrative information on benefit 
receipt from the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR). 
A crucial step in our analysis is the dating of job separations. We have experimented 
with alternative definitions of separation from the stable job held in the late 1970s. The most 
straightforward definition is simply a change in EIN from one year to the next. However, 
there are many cases in which longer employment spells at the same EIN are interrupted for 
a single year. This occurs either due to a transition to non-employment – such as in the case 
of temporary layoffs – or because a worker receives more earnings from another employer. 
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Since we are interested in permanent separations from the long-term job, an alternative 
definition is to consider the first separation that is permanent. After some experimentation 
summarized in the sensitivity analysis, we have settled on defining job separations as 
occurring when the first separation is also permanent. This is the cleanest definition, and 
avoids possible intermediate cases, such as when a worker leaves the firm and then receives 
severance pay a year later. As shown below, the last two definitions yield almost identical 
results; the first definition also yields similar results. 
2.  Trends in Job Separations and Average Characteristics of Separators 
We begin our descriptive analysis with a description of separation rates and the 
average characteristics of workers separating from long-term jobs. As a way of introducing 
our new data source, Figure 1 shows the average job separation rate according to our first 
definition (any change in EIN; in estimates not shown, we show that the vast majority of 
changes in EIN are permanent). Panel A shows the total annual separation rate and the rate 
of transition between two EINs. The figure contains three messages. First, the job 
separation rate is high, fluctuating around 35%. This is actually somewhat lower than other 
estimates of the rate of job separation using administrative data (e.g., Anderson and Meyer 
1994). Second, as found by others, the job-separation rate is highly pro-cyclical, suggesting 
that the bulk of job separations are driven by voluntary job mobility (e.g., Shimer 2004, 
Solon et al. 2007). Third, an important part of the level and movements of overall job 
separations are driven by job-to-job transitions. This confirms that a large share of job 
transitions are voluntary. Panel B of Figure 1 shows the same patterns by age group. As is 
typically found, job separation rates are highest and most pro-cyclical for younger workers 
(e.g., Topel and Ward 1992). However, they remain significant for ages between 30 and 50, 
as well as for workers above age 50. 
We next examine the transitions from jobs into non-employment, where non-
employment is defined as a year without any earnings (see Figure 2).  Given that most non-
employment spells are short, this is an underestimate of the job-to-non-employment 
transition rate. The transition into non-employment is a measure of involuntary job loss, 
albeit an imperfect one. Many involuntarily displaced workers find a job immediately, and 
thus it understates involuntary job loss. On the other hand, some transitions into non-
employment are voluntary, though this is less of a concern for male workers in prime 
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working age and is more important for older workers and women. Consistent with this 
interpretation, Panel A of Figure 2 shows that transitions to non-employment jumped 
dramatically in 1982, a strong recession. Similarly, they rose in the run-up to the 1991 
recession, and rose quite considerably between 2000 and 2002. The figure also shows a 
declining trend in the transition rate to non-employment. Panel B suggests that this trend is 
likely to be in part due to the slowing in the trend towards early retirement among older 
workers. Similarly, since younger workers have much lower transition rates to non-
employment it may have been due to a reduction in the overall age of the population as the 
baby boom cohort entered prime working age. In either case, Panel B clearly demonstrates 
that all age groups experienced a large increase in the transitions to non-employment in 
1982. 
The main message of Figures 1 and 2 is that changes in the overall job separation 
rate mask changes in the composition of the group of separators. Although the rate of 
overall job separations declines in recessions (Figure 1), the fraction of involuntary 
separators among these is likely to rise sharply in economic downturns (Figure 2). Given 
annual job to non-employment transitions are likely to severely understate involuntary job 
loss (both because the vast majority of non-employment spells are short and because many 
job losers may immediately find a job), it is fair to assume that an important fraction of job 
separations in the 1982 recession was involuntary. Clearly, this will not be the case for all 
workers, something that is explicitly addressed in our analysis of the effect of job separations 
on earnings. 
The annual rate of job separation for our two samples of high-attachment workers at 
stable jobs in 1974-1979 or 1978-1980 appears in Figure 3. The figure shows two definitions 
of job separation – any separation (our first definition) or cases where the first separation is 
permanent (our preferred definition). As is found in other studies, permanent job 
separations decline sharply with tenure; thus, Figure 3 shows the rate of job separation is 
higher for workers with three years of tenure (in a stable job from 1978-80), and declines 
over time. Similarly, the frequency of any job separation is higher on average than that of 
permanent separation due to temporary layoffs or delayed payments such as severance pay. 
Our definition of job separation will pool both voluntary job moves as well as 
involuntary job displacements. If the scope for voluntary job mobility declines in recession, 
workers separated from their jobs in the early 1980s should be mostly involuntary movers. 
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In that case, an important concern is that employers may selectively lay off their least 
productive workers. Moreover, in the early 1980s, most firms – whether unionized or not – 
were bound by seniority rules. Table 1 shows that there are indeed significant differences in 
characteristics of workers permanently leaving their long-term employer in 1980-1985 
relative to other workers not experiencing a permanent separation during that period. Job 
separators – whether with six or with three years of job tenure – are on average younger and 
have 15-20% lower annual earnings in 1979.2 Table 1 also shows the industry distribution for 
job separators and non-separators. Job separations are more likely in construction and trade 
and less likely in manufacturing and transportation. Given these significant pre-separation 
differences, it is important to control for the potential of selective job displacement when 
comparing the earnings developments of job separators with a suitable control group, 
something we will address below. 
3. Long-Term Earnings Trends of Job Separators 
We begin with a descriptive analysis of earnings of workers leaving their stable job 
between 1981 and 1982, the trough of the largest recession since the Great Depression. 
Thus, given our definition of job separation, 1981 is the last year these workers receive the 
majority of earnings from their current employer. Our dating of separation implies that for 
many workers, 1980 is likely to be the last year they received full-time earnings from their 
stable job. For example, if a worker left their employer in, say, March of 1981 and had no 
other job that year, we would assign 1982 as date of separation. If he had earnings from 
another employer in 1981 that exceeded the earnings in that year from his long-term job, we 
would assign 1981 as separation date. Alternatively, many workers may leave their long-term 
employer during 1982, but still have the majority of earnings from that employer during that 
year. In that case, we assign 1983 as displacement date. 
Trends in total annual average earnings (including zero earnings values) for workers 
separating from their long-term employer in 1982 appear in Panel A of Figure 4. Several 
features of the data stand out. First, one can see a rise and decline in earnings prior to 1982 
in tune with the business cycle. Second, the figure shows a decline in earnings from 1980 to 
1981, followed by another drop in 1982. The fact that earnings drop prior to the actual 
                                                 
2 Given our dating of separations, workers separating from the employers in 1980 are likely to have reduced 
earnings in 1979. This depresses somewhat our measure of ‘baseline’ earnings for job separators. 
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assigned date of separation is a by-product of our definition of job separations. Third, one 
can see some recovery until the late 1980s. However, in the long run a clear gap in earnings 
relative to the pre-separation level remains. Note that to avoid counting transitions into 
retirement as earnings loss, we have set earnings to missing for workers who are older than 
60. This may lead us to undercount earnings losses if job separation leads to earlier 
retirement in the long run. 
To put these earnings losses in perspective, Figure 4 also displays the development 
of annual earnings for three groups of non-separators. It is not a priori clear which group of 
workers yields the ideal counterfactual earnings trend. The comparison with each different 
control group yields another answer to the question of the cost of job loss. The most flexible 
control group is simply the group of workers who did not separate from their employer in 
1982. Figure 4 also shows earnings developments for two alternative groups. One group was 
required to have some positive earnings each year from 1980 to 1985. The other group 
consists of workers who had no permanent job separation from 1980 to 1985.  
Three results are apparent from the consideration of non-separators. First, as noted 
in Table 1, non-separators’ earnings are higher prior to separation, and more so for the 
group of stable workers. Second, had separators not left their jobs, their earnings would have 
remained stable throughout the early 1980s and trended upwards. Third, the gap between 
the earnings of separators and non-separators is largest relative to workers not leaving their 
employer from 1980 to 1985. Overall, independently of which control group is chosen as 
counterfactual, it is apparent from the figure that even 15-20 years after a job separation 
affected workers have considerably lower annual earnings than workers who stayed with 
their employer in the early 1980s. 
Our results also suggest an increasing convergence in earnings towards the mid to 
late 1990s (Figure 4A). However, this is mostly due to a decline in average earnings of the 
control group, and closely related to trends in employment (see Panel B of Figure 4). The 
figure shows a monotonic downward trend in the fraction of workers with positive earnings 
who are non-separators. For separators, there is a large decline in the fraction employed at 
job separation (over 15 percentage points). From there, employment declines, albeit at a 
slower rate than for non-separators (note that as for earnings, non-employment at age 60 or 
above is not included in the figures). Thus, part of the decline in earnings of the control 
group may be a pattern of selective retirement among high wage earners during the 1990s. 
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We next examine trends in average annual earnings at the main job for separators but 
excluding wage observations with zero earnings (Panel A of Figure 5). Since Panel B of Figure 
4 shows that job separation affects employment there is likely to be sample selection; i.e., if 
the least able workers drop out as a response to a job separation, some of the pattern in 
Figure 5 may be due to changing average characteristics of the sample, not because of job 
separation. This is a common problem in the analysis of the effect of job loss on wages. The 
patterns in Figure 5 are overall quite similar to those in Figure 4, but with some key 
differences. First, the figure shows a steep decline in earnings from 1980 to 1981, followed 
by stagnation until 1982. The earnings loss in 1982 is smaller than in Figure 4, suggesting 
that the difference in the pattern arises because in Figure 5 we exclude workers who do not 
work immediately after leaving their stable job. Second, the pattern of recovery after 
separation is stronger, leading to a smaller earnings gap in the long run.  Panel B of Figure 5 
shows the same figure but for total annual earnings (i.e., including earnings earned from a 
second employer). The patterns are very similar to those in Panel A. 
Figures 4 and 5 only show the pattern for job separations occurring in a single year. 
In our statistical analysis in the next section, we will pool displacements occurring in several 
adjacent years to average out idiosyncratic effects of job separations pertaining to particular 
years. Figure 6 shows the average earnings before and after a permanent job separation 
occurring between 1980 and 1985 (we consider alternative year ranges in the sensitivity 
analysis). The figure shows all three earnings measures we use – total earnings including 
zeros, total earnings without zeros, and earnings at the main employer.  
Note that we have scaled years such that zero on the horizontal axis now refers to 
the last year a worker received their main earnings from the long-term employer. This is a definition 
commonly used in the literature (e.g., Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993, Appendix B). 
Of course, which date is called the date of separation is somewhat arbitrary. As seen before, 
given the way we define separations the figure shows a drop at time zero and then a further 
decline in period 1. Thus, to obtain a measure of the earnings loss at the time of separation, 
one should compare year -1 (when the individual last received full time earnings from the old 
principal employer) to year +2 (when the individual, if in stable employment, is likely to 
receive full time earnings from the new principal employer).  
The figure again shows an increase in earnings prior to job loss that is likely due to 
cyclical conditions. Earnings decline steeply around the year of job separation. There is some 
 11 
recovery initially that slows after 5 years for total earnings where zeros are included. This is 
our preferred measure, since there is no risk of sample selection due to the fact that job 
separation affects the probability of working. The recovery is much faster for workers with 
positive earnings. As we will see in the next section, this apparent quick recovery is partly 
due to the business cycle. Earnings losses turn out to be more persistent when we control 
for the effects of the business cycle using our control group below. 
We summarize the results by examining average annual earnings, with and without 
zeros and for the main employer and all employers, as well as the fraction employed for 
every two years from 1974 to 2003 (Table 2). The first columns show the values for 
separators, the right columns show the numbers for the most liberal control group (all 
workers without a permanent separation from their long-term employer in 1982). The 
numbers in the table reflect the pattern in the figures. Overall, as measured by the evolution 
of total annual earnings (including zero earnings to avoid the problem of sample selection), 
workers separating from their job during the 1982 recession experience considerable long-
term reductions in earnings. Table 3 summarizes the patterns corresponding to Figure 6. 
4. The Long-Term Earnings Losses from Job Separation 
As documented in Table 1 and apparent from Figures 4 and 5, there are systematic 
differences in average earnings and age among workers separating from their long-term 
employment in the early 1980s and workers keeping their job. On the other hand, it is 
apparent that there are strong cyclical swings and trends in earnings that may confound the 
effects of job loss. To get a complete picture of the long-term earnings losses of job 
separators, we need to make a comparison to a control group but at the same time explicitly 
account for possible systematic differences among workers in a regression framework.  
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where the outcome variable ity  represents a measure of annual earnings, the year dummies 
tγ  are identified by the presence of workers not separating from their job (the control 
group), and the error itu  represents truly random components affecting the outcome. The 
coefficients kδ  on the dummies indicating the k-th period before, during, or after job 
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separation ( kitD ) measure the time path of earnings changes of job separators before and 
after a displacement relative to the baseline and the control group. The ability to estimate the 
dynamic effect of job separation is of particular interest since it will allow us to obtain 
summary measures of the overall lifetime cost of job separation. 
The displacement effect is identified by the inclusion of workers staying at their 
employers throughout the period under study (the control group). To interpret the estimated 
effects kδ  as the causal impact of job separation on earnings, however, we have to assume 
that conditional on worker fixed effects and included observable baseline characteristics, 
displaced workers are observationally equal to those workers in the control group. This is the 
strategy chosen by most classic studies of the effect of job loss (e.g., Ruhm 1990, Jacobson, 
Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993). If workers are on average remunerated according to their 
productivity, then a long-run average of earnings should be a good index of their overall 
earnings potential. In this case, comparing a job separator and a non-separator with similar 
worker fixed effects would yield a valid estimate of the effect of job loss.  
Given the large change in earnings for job separators, this approach is most 
persuasive in the presence of a long window of observation prior to the job separation. 
Similarly, it is most appropriate for mature workers whose earnings represent their 
productivity. For example, in the case of younger workers, wages often do not yet reflect 
their long-term earnings potential and fixed effect strategies are not viable (e.g., von Wachter 
and Bender 2006). Since our observation window covers a long time period prior to job 
separation and the average age of workers in our sample is close to forty, we believe our 
fixed effect estimation strategy will uncover estimates that yield good first approximations of 
the causal effect of job separations on earnings. 
The coefficients kδ  show the effect of separation on annual earnings before and 
after the year of employment at the last job (i.e., k=0 during the last year we record the old 
employer to be the main employer – see Figure 7). Table 4 displays the coefficient estimates 
for every other year with corresponding standard errors. The figure and table show the 
results from three specifications: including only year effects (and thereby effectively 
introducing the control group); including year effects and a fourth order polynomial in 
current age (and thus accounting for differential age of treatment and control groups); and 
finally including year effects, age controls, and worker fixed effects. The last is our preferred 
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specification. The Figure confirms several key observations made in our descriptive analysis, 
but offers some new insights. First, without worker fixed effects average earnings of job 
separators are lower than those of the control group prior to job loss; once we control for 
fixed effects, this long-term difference goes away, and earnings differences prior to job loss 
are not significantly different from zero. This gives confidence in the fixed effect approach 
(note that when including worker fixed effects, we have to drop at least one pre/post 
dummy kitD ; we drop the first, in our sample k=-11). Second, even including worker fixed 
effects, there are significant long-run losses in earnings. For example, the losses are about 
$10,000 ten years after job loss, or about 25%. Twenty years after job separations, earnings 
are about $4000 below the baseline – a long run loss of about 10%. Thus, we find very large 
persistent earnings losses following job separation. 
Second, we find that controlling for year fixed effects alone increases the persistence 
of earnings losses compared to average losses shown in Figure 6. This result implies that part 
of the apparent recovery in average earnings observed in Figure 4 is due to cyclical recovery 
in the mid-1980s. Once we take out year effects, true earnings losses from job separations 
are more persistent. Third, including age effects does not significantly alter the estimates. 
Thus, overall we find that job separation during the 1982 recession had very long-lasting 
effects on annual earnings, and significantly reduced workers’ lifetime earnings.  
The magnitude of these estimates is on the same order as what Jacobson, Lalonde, 
and Sullivan (1993) found for workers laid off in Pennsylvania during the same time period. 
There are key differences between our estimate and theirs, however. First, their preferred 
estimate considers workers laid off during mass-layoffs at the establishment level. The 
earnings losses of non-mass layoff separators they find are smaller and less persistent. 
Second, they impose that workers have some earnings every year after layoff to ensure that 
they are still present in the Pennsylvania economy (since otherwise they would drop out of 
their sample). This forces the sample to be composed of more successful workers, and is 
likely to lead to an underestimate of the effect of job separations. 
To show this directly, Figure 8 displays estimates from our preferred specification 
including worker fixed effects for total earnings as before, positive earnings from the main 
employer, and total positive earnings (i.e., with zero earnings excluded from the sample); 
these latter measures are closer to Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan’s (1993) definition. Not 
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surprisingly, once we exclude zero earnings, the earnings losses are smaller and eventually 
converge to zero. However, convergence occurs only after a long period, about 16 years. 
Prior to that earnings losses are large – $6500 after ten years, and still $2700 at 15 years. 
Thus, both earnings and employment losses every year are substantial and lead to important 
reductions in life time earnings. 
Comparing these losses directly to the estimates in Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan’s 
figures is still difficult, since their estimates refer to quarterly earnings and we pool mass-
layoff separators and non-mass layoff separators (their Figures 2 and 3). Our estimates have 
to be compared to an average between these two estimates weighted by the fraction of job 
separators affected by mass-layoff. Taking such an average and summing losses within a 
year, we obtain losses of similar magnitudes. This has two important implications; first, the 
large earnings losses found for Pennsylvania appear to carry over to a nationally 
representative sample of job separators. Since the Pennsylvania sample was heavily skewed 
towards job separations in durable goods manufacturing (e.g., the steel industry), this is an 
important extension of the earlier results. Second, the earlier paper had only six years of 
post-separation information on earnings. Our results indicate that convergence in earnings 
for separators and non-separators continues beyond this period, and that it takes a long time.  
However, our results must be viewed with some caution because we exclude certain 
sectors of the economy that have been growing especially fast in recent decades. Because we 
exclude the public administration, health, and legal services sectors, among others, our 
results may not apply to all workers in the economy. 
5.  Sensitivity – Differences over Time and by Pre-Separation Job Tenure 
Alternative Separation Periods  We have argued that the earnings losses due to job 
separations we find should be particularly large because separation occurred during the 1982 
recession. If this is true, earnings losses of high-attachment workers should be smaller when 
they occur in more favorable economic times. Figure 9 shows average earnings losses 
occurring in five-year time windows ranging from 1980-1985 to 1984-1989. The figure 
shows average total annual earnings before and after job separations for separators in Panel 
A (with zeros) and in Panel C (without zeros). Panel B and Panel D show the corresponding 
coefficient estimates when we control for year effects, a quartic in age, and worker fixed 
effects. Thereby, to keep the samples comparable, we held the duration of pre-separation job 
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tenure constant (i.e., these are workers employed at a stable job beginning with the range 
1974-1979, as in our baseline, to the range 1978-1983). There are some differences in 
average age (workers’ average age is higher in the latter years) as well as in the degree of 
selection. Workers who remain at their jobs during 1978-1983 survived a large recession; 
similarly, during a boom there may be more successful voluntary separators; last, during a 
boom the firm is more likely to let its least able worker go. Thus, care has to be taken when 
interpreting the additional estimates and when comparing them to our baseline results. 
Nevertheless, if there are strong differences in the effect of job separation across the 
business cycle, the comparison in Figure 9 should be a useful point of departure.  
The figure has three important messages. First, as expected, job separations 
occurring in times of economic growth lead to long-term earnings losses that are on average 
smaller than those occurring in recessions. Second, the differences in the long-term earnings 
losses over time are not large; even job losses occurring between 1984 to 1989 lead to 
persistent earnings losses that fade only after 15 years (Panel B and D). Third, it appears that 
average earnings of job separators increase prior to separation once we control for worker 
fixed effects. Thus, it appears job separators and non-separators may be differentially 
affected by business cycle trends, or may have different average rates of earnings growth. In 
this case, worker fixed effects are not sufficient, and one should include individual specific 
slope coefficients. Note that this increase also implies that although long-term losses are 
smaller, relative to the pre-job loss level the initial loss is about as large in boom as in 
recession times. 
We explore these differences further by contrasting regression results with and 
without worker fixed effects for job separations occurring during alternative time ranges 
(Figure 10). The first two panels (Panels A and B) show that for job separations occurring to 
an important extent during recession years, separators have on average lower earnings prior 
to job separations than non-separators. Thus, including worker fixed effects leads to 
significantly smaller earnings differences. The last two panels (Panels C and D) show that 
including worker fixed effects makes no difference for the analysis of separations occurring 
mostly during boom years. The figures also show that, as noted in Figure 9, average earnings 
of separators rise beyond that of non separators before job separators. Again, this implies 
worker fixed effects may not be sufficient to control for systematic differences among 
workers. It may also be that during good economic times a higher fraction of voluntary 
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separators are included among separators; these may be successful workers experience pre-
separation earnings growth. Voluntary separators may be averaged together with less able 
workers who are responsible for the large observed losses at job separation. 
Lower Job Tenure  It has long been speculated that part of the persistent earnings 
losses after a job separation may be due to a loss in job-specific investments that workers 
and firms incur during a longer employment spell. Since by definition these investments are 
not productive in the outside market, workers’ earnings decline at a job loss. This implies 
that workers leaving their employer after a shorter employment spell may fare better in terms 
of post-separation earnings. We thus replicated our main results for workers in stable 
employment for three years, from 1978 to 1980. Another reason to contrast the earnings 
losses at job separation is that job separations at three years of tenure are more common 
than at six years. If we confirm that losses are substantially higher for high tenured workers 
(e.g., Kletzer 1989) this would also indicate the need to target in particular high tenured job 
separators with policies aimed to help job losers. 
Panel B of Figure 6 shows the average earnings of job separators before and after the 
last period on their main job for separations occurring between 1980 and 1985. The figure 
suggests that earnings losses for workers with at least three years of job tenure have actually 
larger initial losses in earnings. The recovery in average earnings occurs slower at the 
beginning, but then increases in speed such that convergence occurs at about the same time. 
These differences hold for all three measures of earnings. 
These patterns are reversed once we include worker fixed effects. Panel A of Figure 
11 compares estimates with and without worker fixed effects for workers with three years of 
job tenure and workers with six years of job tenure. (Table 5 displays the coefficient 
estimates for every other year with corresponding standard errors.) Without worker fixed 
effects earnings losses are of similar order of magnitude. Once we control for worker fixed 
effects however, the long-term earnings loss is significantly smaller for workers with shorter 
amount of job tenure. The estimates still imply long lasting earnings declines – convergence 
still occurs only after 15 years. However, they also suggest that a larger part of the earnings 
losses of short tenured workers are due to negative selection. That is, among job separators 
with shorter tenure spells a larger proportion has lower long-term earnings potential. Once 
we control for this difference using worker fixed effects, the difference in earnings loss is 
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smaller. This suggests that firms may have more of a choice when laying off short tenured 
workers and that in that case they actively discriminate in favor of more productive 
employees. Panel B of Figure 11 shows estimates of the earnings loss at job separation for 
workers with three years of job tenure with worker fixed effects for alternative earnings 
concepts. The pattern of Panel A is confirmed and reinforced; for short tenured workers 
with positive earnings convergence now occurs after 10 years. 
Figures 12 and 13 repeat the comparison of the effects of job separation over time 
for workers with three years of tenure. As before, we have kept the tenure requirement fixed 
at at least three years. The results confirm the patterns in Figures 9 and 10. Even short 
tenured workers separating from their employers during boom times experience 
considerable and persistent earnings losses. As before, we find that these losses are reduced 
with respect to losses in a recession. Similarly, we confirm that there seems to be an 
important degree of negative selection in periods of recessions, but not in periods of boom. 
Overall, the results from our sensitivity analysis suggest that persistent earnings 
losses are not only a feature of separations from very stable jobs occurring in recessions. It 
appears that large and long-lasting losses even occur for workers at their job for at least three 
years or workers displaced in boom times. However, there are important distinctions 
between the different types and years of separation that deserve further study. In particular, 
the pattern of selection into job separation appears to differ between boom and recessions. 
There appears to be less negative selection into job separation based on long-term earnings 
in boom times. This is not surprising, since we would expect there to be more positively 
selected voluntary movers in periods of economic expansion that offsets any negative 
selection on the firm side. There also appears to be more negative selection into job 
separation for workers with shorter job durations at separation. This result is consistent with 
the notion that firms are more constrained by seniority rules in making layoff decisions 
regarding high-tenured workers (e.g., Abraham and Medoff 1984). 
Alternative Definitions of Separation  In the main part of the paper, we consider a 
worker to be a separator if his first separation from his long-term employer was also 
permanent. Appendix Figures 1 and 2 show the pre/post earnings development (Figure 6) 
for the case when we consider any separation or any permanent separation as our definition 
of job separation. Appendix Figure 1 shows the earnings changes of workers with six years 
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of job tenure for our three definitions of job separation. The figure suggests it does not 
make any difference whether we consider any permanent separation or only first separations 
that are permanent. Earnings losses are slightly smaller for the case of any job separation. 
This is not surprising, since that definition includes workers only temporarily separating 
from their main employer. The fact that only the effect on employment is more negative in 
the first period of separation in the case of any separation suggests that an important 
number of such short-term transitions involve temporary layoff without alternative 
employment. Appendix Figure 2 confirms these results for workers separating with at least 
three years of tenure on their long-term job. The different definitions now yield results that 
are even more similar. 
6.  Preliminary Summary and Suggestions for Further Research 
Every year a large fraction of workers lose their job in the U.S. labor market. Yet, 
despite a long literature attempting to quantify the costs of job loss, no representative and 
comprehensive estimate of the long-term consequences of job separations exists. This is 
particularly worrisome because existing estimates based on limited samples or time periods 
suggest that the costs could be large and persistent at least for some groups of workers. If 
this were to be upheld in more representative samples and for most time periods, it would 
have important implications for the costs of economic adjustment in the U.S. economy. In 
particular, while the ability to fire ‘at will’ may benefit adjustment in the labor market as a 
whole, the costs in terms of lost productivity and earnings of individual workers may be 
much higher than typical replacement rates of unemployment insurance or other programs 
designed to smooth temporary earnings fluctuations. 
We use a longitudinal administrative data source that may not be well known in the 
research community to study the long-term effects of job separation on earnings for a 
representative sample of high-attachment workers leaving their jobs during the 1982 
recession. Our sample allows us to follow workers who left a stable job for over twenty years 
after job loss, and compare their earnings developments to the outcomes of workers of 
similar age and earnings potential that did not separate from their employers. In our present 
research design, we cannot directly control whether workers leave their employer voluntarily 
or not. However, our analysis of the incidence of job separations over the business cycle 
suggests that an important fraction of job separations during the strong 1982 recession were 
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involuntary. Inclusion of voluntary movers implies that our results may underestimate the 
true cost of job loss. To control for the potential of negative selection of job separators, the 
long time period of our data allows us to control for worker fixed effects. 
Our preliminary results suggest that job separations during the early 1980s led to 
large and persistent earnings losses that last over twenty years. Those workers in stable 
employment from 1974 to 1979 who left their jobs during 1980 to 1985 had – compared to 
workers with no permanent job separation during that period – initial earnings losses of 
30%. These losses decline to 20% after ten years and drop below 10% only after 15 years; 
for our main sample, earnings losses have not completely faded 20 years after a job loss. 
Even for workers with lower pre-separation tenure or workers separating from their 
employers in better economic times, losses are still substantial and last up to 15 years. 
We will work on four significant extensions of our analysis. First, our large sample 
size allows us to analyze the effects of job separation by age, gender, race, region, industry, 
and socio-economic status. Second, we will make sure that the losses we find are not driven 
by the fact that separations may occur in lower paying or declining firms or industries. Third, 
our long time period allows us to control for potential differences in individual long-term 
earnings trends of separators and non-separators. Last, and most importantly, we will isolate 
the group of workers who leaves the firm during a major layoff or during a firm closure. 
Using information on such firm-level events obtained from administrative data, we will be 
able to isolate workers who are truly involuntarily displaced.  
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The sample of workers used for our analysis of the long-term consequences of job 
separations is based on three data sets. The three sources are the 2004 Continuous Work 
History Sample (CWHS) active file, a 1 percent extract from the Master Earnings File 
(MEF), and a 1 percent extract from the Longitudinal Employee-Employer Data (LEED). 
SSA 1 percent samples are selected by a “stratified cluster design” based on certain 
serial digits of the Social Security Number (SSN). They are generally considered to be 
random samples and contain a large number of observations that represent the general 
population. Individuals are followed through their lives, thereby giving us longitudinal data. 
The 2004 CWHS is a 1 percent sample that gives us the baseline sample universe and 
the matching longitudinal earnings and demographic information. It contains information on 
Social Security covered (“capped”) earnings from 1951 through 2004, uncapped total 
earnings from 1978 through 2004, and basic demographic characteristics of persons who 
have any report of covered earnings in 1951 through 2004 as well as those who have any 
report of uncovered earnings in 1978 through 2004.  
The MEF contains information on a worker’s total uncapped annual earnings for 
each job held in a given year beginning in 1978 through 2004 and an identification number 
for each employer (EIN). It also has information on industry for each job. 
The LEED is a longitudinal employee-employer file that starts in 1957. The sampling 
approach is the same as in the 1 percent CWHS, but individual earnings are reported at the 
employer level. A record exists for each employer that employed a worker in the sample in 
each year. The dataset includes basic demographic characteristics as well as compensation 
information subject to top-coding at the employer-employee record level up to 1978 but 
with no top-coding after 1978. The dataset also contains information about the employer 
such as geographic information and a three-digit industry code. The LEED also includes 
imputed wages above the taxable maximum from 1957 to 1977. The imputation procedure is 
based on the quarter in which a person reached the taxable maximum and is known as 
Method II. The idea is to use earnings for quarters when they are observed to impute 
earnings in quarters that are not observed because the annual taxable maximum has been 








Number of Workers 13841 23820 30432 40106
Average Age 36.6 37.6 33.5 36.1
Fraction Employed in Mining in 
1979
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Fraction Employed in Construction 
in 1979
0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07
Fraction Employed in 
Manufacturing in 1979
0.47 0.52 0.40 0.47
Fraction Employed in 
Transportation in 1979
0.10 0.16 0.10 0.16
Fraction Employed in Trade in 1979 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.17
Fraction Employed in FIRE in 1979 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Fraction Employed in Services in 
1979
0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05
Average Earnings At Main 
Employer in 1979
46,007 55,422 36,557 48,694
Average Earnings at All Employers 
in 1979
47,137 55,912 37,845 49,210
Median Earnings at Main 
Employer in 1979
41,846 50,302 32,666 44,246
Median Earnings at All Employers 
in 1979
42,798 50,695 33,897 44,713
Standard Deviation of Earnings at 
Main Employer in 1979
30,537 32,857 28,278 31,539
Standard Deviation of Earnings at 
All Employers in 1979
30,715 33,623 28,882 31,743





Table 1: Average Characteristics of High Attachment Workers in 1979 Before Permanent 






























1974 40,703         40,703         40,703         1 44,426 44,426 44,426 1
1976 45,229         45,229         45,229         1 48,572 48,572 48,572 1
1978 50,000         50,494         50,494         1 54,114 54,538 54,538 1
1980 46,101         46,648         46,648         1 49,511 50,502 48,918 0.97
1982 36,038         40,198         31,518         0.78 48,449 49,328 47,057 0.95
1984 41,944         43,552         34,875         0.80 51,871 52,961 48,726 0.92
1986 45,379         46,837         37,004         0.79 53,480 54,708 49,647 0.91
1988 46,878         48,659         38,131         0.78 56,080 57,320 50,713 0.88
1990 48,381         49,684         38,514         0.77 54,084 55,220 47,922 0.87
1992 48,078         49,288         38,312         0.77 53,490 54,571 47,261 0.85
1994 46,294         47,995         37,477         0.76 52,069 53,253 46,659 0.84
1996 46,499         47,901         38,098         0.76 51,208 52,494 46,289 0.83
1998 48,939         50,520         40,474         0.75 52,243 53,642 47,883 0.81
2000 48,694         50,352         39,592         0.74 52,719 54,221 48,740 0.80
2002 46,498         47,805         38,075         0.72 47,517 48,679 42,623 0.77
Table 2: Average Annual Earnings for Male Job Separators Leaving Firm in 1982 and Non-Separators
Note: Average annual earnings and fraction worked for workers at same employer from 1974-1979. 1% Sample Social 
Security Administrative Data. Earnings are in 2000 Dollars.
Stable Employment 1974-1979



















-10 43.90 43.90 43.90 -- -- --
(1.53) (1.59) (1.61) -- -- --
-8 44.10 44.10 44.10 -- -- --
(0.82) (0.85) (0.87) -- -- --
-6 45.22 45.16 45.22 45.29 44.35 45.29
(0.60) (0.62) (0.63) (1.13) (1.18) (1.21)
-4 46.60 46.44 46.60 44.09 43.35 44.09
(0.52) (0.54) (0.55) (0.58) (0.61) (0.62)
-2 47.70 47.35 47.70 40.35 39.54 40.35
(0.52) (0.54) (0.55) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40)
0 39.40 36.44 39.40 33.24 30.42 33.24
(0.52) (0.54) (0.55) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40)
4 35.19 42.80 44.36 32.39 38.42 40.20
(0.52) (0.61) (0.62) (0.38) (0.44) (0.45)
6 36.83 45.50 47.00 34.71 41.75 43.56
(0.52) (0.61) (0.62) (0.38) (0.44) (0.45)
8 36.38 45.43 46.97 35.16 42.75 44.44
(0.53) (0.62) (0.63) (0.38) (0.44) (0.45)
10 36.37 45.80 47.27 35.11 43.35 44.87
(0.54) (0.63) (0.64) (0.39) (0.45) (0.46)
12 37.08 46.43 47.74 36.04 44.61 46.13
(0.56) (0.64) (0.65) (0.40) (0.46) (0.47)
14 38.47 47.52 48.94 37.38 46.09 47.68
(0.58) (0.66) (0.66) (0.41) (0.47) (0.48)
16 40.44 49.23 50.72 39.50 48.31 50.14
(0.61) (0.67) (0.68) (0.42) (0.47) (0.48)
18 40.87 50.09 51.64 41.00 50.63 52.50
(0.65) (0.70) (0.71) (0.43) (0.49) (0.50)
20 39.91 48.58 50.16 40.57 50.45 52.37
(0.72) (0.77) (0.78) (0.47) (0.53) (0.54)
22 37.05 47.27 48.54 38.99 50.60 52.15
(0.90) (0.96) (0.98) (0.59) (0.68) (0.69)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 1% Sample Social Security Administrative Data. Earnings are in 2000 
Dollars.
Stable Employment 1978-1980
Table 3: Average Annual Earnings Before and After Job Separation of High Attachment Workers 
Leaving Firm 1980-1985






























-10 -6.73 -4.29 0 -6.68 -4.24 0 -6.79 -4.34 0
(0.73) (0.69) 0 (0.73) (0.70) 0 (0.73) (0.70) 0
-8 -6.53 -4.80 -0.61 -6.48 -4.76 -0.75 -6.58 -4.86 -0.90
(0.42) (0.41) (0.81) (0.42) (0.41) (0.78) (0.42) (0.41) (0.80)
-6 -5.41 -4.21 -0.01 -5.42 -4.25 -0.40 -5.47 -4.30 -0.65
(0.35) (0.34) (0.88) (0.35) (0.34) (0.85) (0.35) (0.34) (0.87)
-4 -4.94 -4.01 0.19 -5.04 -4.15 -0.35 -5.09 -4.20 -0.69
(0.32) (0.31) (0.92) (0.32) (0.31) (0.90) (0.32) (0.31) (0.91)
-2 -4.52 -4.09 -0.40 -4.88 -4.48 -1.13 -4.90 -4.49 -1.49
(0.32) (0.31) (0.96) (0.32) (0.31) (0.93) (0.32) (0.31) (0.95)
0 -14.22 -13.25 -8.56 -17.47 -16.48 -12.12 -15.08 -14.08 -10.02
(0.40) (0.39) (1.05) (0.38) (0.37) (1.01) (0.40) (0.39) (1.04)
4 -19.93 -19.18 -14.29 -13.74 -12.66 -9.85 -13.00 -11.92 -9.49
(0.49) (0.48) (1.06) (0.53) (0.53) (1.04) (0.54) (0.54) (1.06)
6 -18.43 -17.86 -12.93 -11.98 -11.11 -8.19 -11.49 -10.62 -8.08
(0.59) (0.59) (1.07) (0.68) (0.68) (1.07) (0.68) (0.68) (1.08)
8 -17.69 -17.36 -12.38 -12.04 -11.44 -8.23 -11.53 -10.94 -8.11
(0.59) (0.59) (1.06) (0.66) (0.66) (1.05) (0.67) (0.67) (1.06)
10 -15.64 -15.60 -10.69 -10.33 -10.05 -6.61 -9.89 -9.63 -6.56
(0.62) (0.62) (1.08) (0.69) (0.69) (1.06) (0.70) (0.70) (1.09)
12 -13.31 -13.60 -8.94 -8.22 -8.23 -4.93 -7.96 -8.00 -5.08
(0.73) (0.73) (1.14) (0.80) (0.80) (1.14) (0.82) (0.82) (1.16)
14 -11.18 -11.64 -7.25 -6.12 -6.43 -3.10 -5.87 -6.20 -3.25
(0.86) (0.86) (1.21) (0.94) (0.94) (1.21) (0.97) (0.97) (1.24)
16 -9.10 -9.63 -5.37 -4.00 -4.55 -1.15 -3.78 -4.35 -1.35
(1.18) (1.18) (1.46) (1.30) (1.30) (1.51) (1.32) (1.31) (1.53)
18 -8.08 -8.80 -4.75 -2.40 -3.33 0.12 -2.17 -3.15 -0.10
(1.21) (1.21) (1.51) (1.32) (1.31) (1.54) (1.34) (1.33) (1.57)
20 -8.03 -8.95 -4.65 -2.80 -4.17 -0.07 -2.54 -3.97 -0.29
(1.12) (1.12) (1.35) (1.20) (1.20) (1.35) (1.23) (1.23) (1.39)
22 -7.55 -8.69 -3.01 -1.35 -3.17 1.75 -1.29 -3.18 1.28
(1.20) (1.20) (1.37) (1.45) (1.46) (1.46) (1.47) (1.47) (1.48)
Earnings (in $1000) at All Employers
Earnings (in $1000) at All Employers 
Including Zeros
Table 4: Regression Estimates of the Long-Term Costs of Job Separation of Workers in Stable Employment 1974-1979, Leaving Firm 1980-
1985, Alternative Specifications 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 1% Sample Social Security Administrative Data.



























-6 -2.85 -2.20 0.00 -2.87 -2.24 0.00 -2.94 -2.30 0.00
(0.58) (0.54) (0.00) (0.58) (0.54) (0.00) (0.58) (0.54) (0.00)
-4 -4.80 -3.30 1.59 -4.98 -3.44 1.23 -4.95 -3.39 1.36
(0.33) (0.31) (0.68) (0.33) (0.31) (0.66) (0.33) (0.31) (0.69)
-2 -8.41 -5.67 1.56 -8.88 -6.06 0.88 -8.75 -5.90 0.99
(0.23) (0.23) (0.78) (0.23) (0.23) (0.76) (0.23) (0.23) (0.80)
0 -15.75 -13.06 -5.56 -18.88 -15.98 -8.69 -16.62 -13.70 -6.46
(0.26) (0.26) (0.85) (0.25) (0.25) (0.82) (0.26) (0.26) (0.87)
4 -19.27 -17.20 -9.61 -14.64 -11.80 -6.57 -13.83 -10.98 -5.94
(0.35) (0.34) (0.90) (0.37) (0.37) (0.88) (0.38) (0.38) (0.92)
6 -17.16 -15.55 -7.92 -12.37 -9.95 -4.66 -11.74 -9.32 -4.22
(0.41) (0.41) (0.93) (0.45) (0.45) (0.91) (0.46) (0.46) (0.96)
8 -15.74 -14.65 -6.97 -11.59 -9.68 -4.05 -11.06 -9.17 -3.73
(0.45) (0.44) (0.97) (0.49) (0.49) (0.96) (0.50) (0.50) (1.01)
10 -13.66 -13.10 -5.47 -9.81 -8.48 -2.52 -9.39 -8.09 -2.32
(0.46) (0.46) (1.01) (0.51) (0.51) (1.01) (0.52) (0.52) (1.06)
12 -12.00 -11.86 -4.46 -8.18 -7.46 -1.50 -7.79 -7.11 -1.35
(0.51) (0.51) (1.00) (0.57) (0.56) (0.99) (0.58) (0.58) (1.05)
14 -10.22 -10.46 -3.26 -6.19 -6.10 0.00 -5.89 -5.85 0.06
(0.55) (0.55) (1.01) (0.61) (0.61) (1.01) (0.63) (0.63) (1.07)
16 -8.98 -9.48 -2.42 -4.83 -5.31 0.80 -4.46 -5.00 0.91
(0.69) (0.69) (1.12) (0.77) (0.77) (1.16) (0.79) (0.79) (1.20)
18 -7.98 -8.77 -1.79 -3.04 -4.15 2.05 -2.67 -3.85 2.14
(0.82) (0.82) (1.17) (0.92) (0.92) (1.24) (0.94) (0.94) (1.27)
20 -7.20 -8.29 -0.76 -2.31 -3.96 2.87 -1.81 -3.56 3.05
(0.96) (0.96) (1.20) (1.09) (1.08) (1.26) (1.11) (1.10) (1.29)
22 -5.84 -7.32 1.42 0.29 -2.03 5.75 0.61 -1.83 5.67
(1.17) (1.17) (1.31) (1.34) (1.33) (1.39) (1.35) (1.34) (1.42)
Earnings (in $1000) at All Employers
Earnings (in $1000) at All Employers 
Including Zeros
Table 5: Regression Estimates of the Long-Term Costs of Job Separation of Workers in Stable Employment 1978-1980, Leaving Firm 1981-
1985, Alternative Specifications
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 1% Sample Social Security Administrative Data.







1980 1982 1985 1991 1995 2001 2005
Year
Total Separation Rate Job-Job Flows
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Vertical Lines At Business Cycle troughs.






1980 1982 1985 1991 1995 2001 2005
Year
Age 18-29 Age 30-50
Age 51+
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Vertical Lines At Business Cycle troughs.












1980 1982 1985 1991 1995 2001 2005
Year
Age 18-29 Age 30-50
Age 51+
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Vertical Lines At Business Cycle troughs.










1980 1982 1985 1991 1995 2001 2005
Year
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Vertical Lines At Business Cycle troughs.









1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
Any Separation, Tenure 74-79 Any Separation, Tenure 78-80
Permanent Sep., Tenure 74-79 Permanent Sep., Tenure 78-80
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
Figure 3: Job Separations for High Attachment Workers from Long-Term Job





1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
No Permanent Separation 1982 Permanent Job Separation 1982
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 4B: Fraction Any Positive Earnings Among Workers Separating in 1982






1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
No Permanent Separation 1982 No Permanent Separation 80-90
Earnings Each Year 1980-86 Permanent Job Separation 1982
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 4A: Annual Earnings at All Jobs for Wokers Separating in 1982 and







1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
No Permanent Separation 1982 No Permanent Separation 80-90
Earnings Each Year 1980-86 Permanent Job Separation 1982
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 5B: Positive Annual Earnings at All Jobs for Wokers Separating in 1982






1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
No Permanent Separation 1982 No Permanent Separation 80-90
Earnings Each Year 1980-86 Permanent Job Separation 1982
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 5A: Positive Annual Earnings at Main Job for Wokers Separating in 1982
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Pos. Earnings Main Job Pos. Earnings All Jobs
Earnings All Jobs Including Zero Earnings
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 6A: Average Earnings Pre/Post Separation 1980-1985 For Separators









Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 6B: Average Earnings Pre/Post Separation 1980-1985 For Separators
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Year Controls Year and Age Controls
Year, Age, and Worker Effects
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
Figure 7: Earnings Losses at Job Separation 1980-1985 Relative to Non-Movers









-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Year Before/After Job Separation
Pos. Earnings Main Job Pos. Earnings All Jobs
Earnings All Jobs Including Zero Earnings
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administ  rative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 8: Earnings Losses at Job Separation 1980-1985 Relative to Non-Movers
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Separations 8085 Separations 8186
Separations 8287 Separations 8388
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Separations 8085 Separations 8186
Separations 8287 Separations 8388
Separations 8489
Panel D: Estimates of Earnings Losses, WorkerFixed effects, Excluding Zeros 
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 9: Earnings Losses at Separation For Different Separation Periods
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Year and Age Controls Year, Age, and Worker Effects
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Year and Age Controls Year, Age, and Worker Effects
Panel D: Earnings Losses at Job Separation 1985-1990
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 10: Earnings Losses at Separation for Different Separation Periods
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Tenure=6, No Worker FE Tenure=3, No Worker FE
Tenure=6, Worker FE Tenure=3, Worker FE
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 11A: Estimate of Earnings Loss at Job Separation
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Tenure=6, No Worker FE Tenure=3, No Worker FE
Tenure=6, Worker FE Tenure=3, Worker FE
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 11B: Estiamtes of Earnings Loss at Job Separation
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Year Before/After Job Separation
Separations 8085 Separations 8186
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Panel D: Earnings Losses, Excluding Zeros 
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 12: Earnings Losses at Separation for Different Separation Periods
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Year and Age Controls Year, Age, and Worker Effects
Panel D: Earnings Losses at Job Separation 1985-1990
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
Figure 13: Earnings Losses at Separation for Different Separation Periods
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Year Before/After Job Separation
MainEarn Perm 1st Sep MainEarn First Sep
MainEarn Perm Sep
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
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TotEarn Perm 1st Sep TotEarn First Sep
TotEarn Perm Sep
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
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EarnZer Perm 1st Sep EarnZer First Sep
EarnZer Perm Sep
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
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Work Perm 1st Sep Work First Sep
Work Perm Sep
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
Panel D: Fraction of Workers with Positive Earnings
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
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MainEarn Perm Sep
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
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Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.











-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Year Before/After Job Separation
EarnZer Perm 1st Sep EarnZer First Sep
EarnZer Perm Sep
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text). Earnings in 2000 Dollars.
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Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
Panel D: Fraction of Workers with Positive Earnings
Source: 1% Files of Social Security administrative data (see text).
Appendix Figure 2: Alternative Measures of Job Separation, Three Years of
Pre-Separation Job Tenure
